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Resolving workplace disputes i 
the United States:The growth 
alternative dispute resolution i 
employment relations 
f 
By David B. Lipsky and Ronald L Seeber 
The rise of alternative 
dispute resolution 
01 more than a decade a "quiet revo-
lution" has been occurring m the Ameri-
can system of justice. There has been a 
dramatic growth in the use of alterna-
tive dispute resolution (ADR) to resolve 
d isputes that might o therwise be 
handled through litigation We define 
ADR as the use of any form of mediation 
or arbitration as a substitute for the public 
judicial or administrative process available 
to resolve a dispute (Lipsky and Seeber, 
1 998A}. In the United States mediation, 
arbitration, and their variants ordinarily 
are private processes m which the dis-
putants themselves select, hire, and pay 
the third-party neutral who resolves, or 
attempts to resolve, their dispute. 
A principal cause of the rise of ADR in 
the United States, many observers be-
lieve, is the perceived ''litigation explo-
sion" that began in the 1960s and, some 
contend, continues to this day Between 
1960 and 1990, Congress passed at least 
two dozen major statutes regulating 
employment conditions, including: 
(1 j the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 
(2) the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act in 1970, 
(3j the Emplo3^ee Retirement Income 
Security Act in 1974, 
(4) the Americans with Disabilities A"t 
in 1990, 
(5j the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and 
(6) the Family and Medical Leave Act of 
1993. 
These statutes and others gave rise to 
new areas of litigation, ranging from 
sexual harassment and accommodation 
of the disabled to age discrimination and 
wrongful termination. More and more 
dimensions of the employment relation-
ship were brought under the scrutiny 
not only of the court system but also of 
a multitude of regulatory agencies. 
An estimated 30 million civil cases arc-
now on the dockets of federal, state, 
and local courts, a number that has 
grown dramatically in recent years In 
the last two decades, the number of 
suits filed in federal courts eoneerr.-
ing employment matters grew by 400 
percent (U.S. Department of Labo.\ 
1994, pp. 25-33). In the decade of the 
1990s, the number of civil cases in U S. 
federal courts involving charges of dis-
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crimination nearly tripled. Plaintiffs who 
won their employment discrimination 
suits received a me-
d ian award of 
$200,000 in 1996, 
one in n i n e re-
ceived an award of 
$1 million or more 
(U.S. Department of 
Jus t i ce , J a n u a r y 
2000, pp. 1-13). In 
sum, the litigation 
explosion clogged 
the dockets of fed-
eral and state courts 
in the U.S., leading 
to longer delays and 
higher costs in the use of traditional 
means of dispute resolution 
§ tie advantages of A U K 
Many organizations have adopted ADR be-
cause tliej believe it is a means of circum-
venting the expensive, time-consuming fea-
tures of conventional litigation The use of 
ADR has the great advantage, when com-
pared to litigation, of providing a taster, 
cheaper, and more efficient means of re-
solving disputes. The parties in a conven-
tional court proceeding often invest con-
siderable money and energy from the time 
of the initial filings in a court suit, through 
interrogatories and depositions, to the time 
of the trial itself They then frequently 
negotiate a settlement "on the courthouse 
steps'' or in the judge's chambers. 
The costs of litigation include, of course, 
not only the awards or settlements them-
selves but also the so-called "transaction 
costs" associated with settling disputes, 
such as the costs of inside and outside le-
gal counsel, expert witnesses, gathering 
documents and engaging in discovery, 
and so forth. The transaction costs of liti-
gation in the United States often are two 
or three times greater than the settle-
In theory.ADR is 
a means of circum-
venting these aspects 
of conventional 
litigation. 
ments themselves (Lipsky and Seeber, 
1998B, p. 142). Moreover, this calculation 
does not include the 
value to the dispu-
t a n t s of the t ime 
saved as a conse-
quence of resolving 
d i spu te s quickly . 
Reducing these "op-
portunity costs" may 
be the largest benefit 
of using ADR. 
In theory, ADR is a 
m e a n s of c i rcum-
venting these aspects 
of conventional liti-
gation. ADR processes usually are not con-
fined by the legal rules that govern court 
proceedings, such as those governing the 
admissibility of evidence and the exami-
nation of witnesses. Arbitrators, for ex-
ample, may conduct expedited hearings, 
dispense with pre- or post-hearing briefs, 
consider hearsay evidence, and allow ad-
vocates to lead their witnesses. Discovery 
is almost never a part of the mediation 
process and is used only slightly more of-
ten in arbitration, usually when the par-
ties request it. 
The parties have significantly more control 
over the ADR process than they would over 
a court proceeding. Within broad limits, the 
parties can design the ADR procedure them-
selves. Because the disputants often jointly 
select the neutral they are likely to have 
more trust and confidence in the neutral's 
ability than they would in a judge who oth-
erwise would be assigned to hear the case. 
Moreover, compliance with the eventual 
settlement is 1 ess likely to be a problem when 
the disputants have controlled the process 
that produced the outcome. 
Although there are many advantages to the 
use of ADR, some observers contend that it 
poses a substantial threat to the United States 
justice system. ADR in effect, transfers the 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment 
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dispute resolution function from public fo-
rums (the courts, regulatory agencies, etc.) 
to private ones. Typically, ADR proceed-
ings are private and confidential. Arbitra-
tion decisions, for example, are seldom pub-
lished because they are considered the prop-
erty of the disputants, in contrast to court 
decisions. The increasing privatization of the 
American s3Tstem of 
justice, critics main-
tain, poses serious 
challenges for the 
guarantees of due pro-
cess and equality un-
der the law (Stone, pp. 
1036-1049, Dekkat 
and Kathawala, 
pp. 83-13J j 
Arbitration, media-
tion, and other ADR 
t echn iques have 
been around for a 
cen tu ry , if not 
longer. Some observers trace their use to 
biblical times. As Riskin and Westbrook 
note. ''Arbitration has an ancient lineage 
and an active present King Solomon, 
Phillip II of Macedon and George Wash-
ington employed arbitration. Commercial 
arbitration has been used in England and 
the United States for hundreds of years'' 
(Riskin and Westbrook, p. 215). Commer-
cial arbitration has proved to be especially 
effective, for example, in resolving breach-
of-contract claims between corporations. 
International arbitration has been used not 
only in commercial disputes but also, of 
course;, as a means of settling differences 
between nations. 
Dispute resolution and 
labor-management 
relations 
Although, the use of arbitration and media-
tion to resolve labor-management disputes 
in the United States originated in the sec-
ond half of the 19lh century, it on y became 
an integral part of the American industrial 
relations system after World War 11 (see. for 
example, Elkouri & Eikoun, pp. 1-27). In 
the U.S. system of industrial relations, a 
sharp distinction is made betwee n disputes 
over "interests" and disputes over ''rights " 
Interest disputes, on the one hand, arise 
over the formation of 
collective bargaining 
agreements . Dis-
putes arising out of 
the application, in-
terpretation, oi en-
forcement of collec-
tive bargaining 
agreements, on the 
other hand, are r grits 
disputes (for a recent 
discussion, see 
Kheel, pp. 33-84 i 
Interest disputes. 
Negot ia t ions be-
tween employers and unions are the prin-
cipal means of resolving—oi avoiding -in-
terest disputes. If the parties reach an im-
passe in the negotiation of a new oo.lec-
tive bargaining agreement, then typically 
mediation is used to help them resolve 
their dispute If the part.es are covered by 
the National Labor Relations Act, then the 
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service 
has jurisdiction over the dispute and pro-
vides the parties with a incdiatoi Arb tra-
tion is almost never used to resolve it ter-
est disputes. (In a handful of states, ir ter-
es! arbitration is used to settle police- and 
firefighter disputes, but it is almost ii'-cor 
used in the private sector.) 
Rights disputes. In contrast almost all 
collective bargaining agreements m the 
United. States incorporate a grievance pro-
cedure for handling disputes over rights. 
The grievance procedure is negotiated by 
the parties and almost aiways provide.1- 'or 
the use of arbitration to resolve grieva> cos 
that have not been settled e arker in the 
Grievance and arbi-
tration procedures in 
collective bargaining 
relationships are a 
form of alternative 
dispute resolution. 
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procedure. The arbitrator is a private party, 
jointly selected and paid by the parties. 
If grievance and arbitration provisions were 
not included in collective bargaining agree-
ments, then presumably unions and employ-
ers would need to resolve their rights dis-
putes either by resort-
ing to concerted activ-
ity (strikes, lockouts, 
or other work stop-
pages) or by suing 
one another in the 
courts to enforce 
their contracts. In 
large measure, there-
fore, using grievance 
procedures and arbi-
tration to resolve dis-
putes over rights is a 
substitute for using 
the court system to 
resolve such disputes 
In other words, griev-
ance and arbitration 
procedures in collective bargaining relation-
ships are a form of alternative dispute reso-
lution. Grievance arbitration has been widely 
considered to be one of the hallmarks of the 
collective bargaining system. It is reasonable 
to assume that the successful use of media-
tion and arbitration in American industrial 
relations spurred the use of ADR as a means 
of resolving other types of disputes. 
The U.S. Supreme Court enhanced the sig-
nificance of grievance arbitration in a se-
ries of landmark decisions In the so-called 
"Steeiworkers Trilogy,"2 three cases de-
cided in 1960 involving the Steeiworkers 
Union, the Court ruled that arbitrator de-
cisions are virtually inviolate and not sub-
ject to review in the federal courts except 
under very special circumstances (Elkouri 
& Elkouri, pp. 28-47). If the Court had not 
severely limited the review of arbitrator 
decisions, then the court system likely 
would have been flooded with petitions to 
review thousands of arbitration awards. 
It becomes apparent 
that a much smaller 
number of companies 
use mediation and 
arbitration frequently, 
even in rights 
disputes. 
This practical consideration was explicitly 
a factor entering into the high court's rea-
soning. After the Trilogy, grievance arbi-
tration flourished. 
Statutory d isputes . Within a few short 
yea r s , however , P r e s iden t Lyndon 
Johnson's "Great So-
ciety" t r iggered a 
flood of federal leg-
islation matched in 
volume only by the 
period of Franklin 
Roosevel t ' s New 
Deal in the 1930s In 
the area of employ-
ment law alone, be-
tween 1960 and 
1980 Congress 
passed at least two 
dozen major statutes 
regulating employ-
m e n t cond i t ions . 
Consequently, arbi-
trators operating un-
der collective bargaining agreements in-
creasingly have been required not onfy 
to interpret those agreements but also to 
apply the various statutes (i e , the "ex-
ternal law") that may be linked to griev-
ants' complaints. 
This rise in the prevalence and importance 
of statutory rights in labor-management 
arbitration has been a source of consider-
able concern. The need for arbitrators to 
apply external law in a growing number 
of cases requires that thej rbe expert in the 
content and application of these statutes. 
Questions have arisen about the prepara-
tion and expertise of arbitrators who are 
called upon to resolve statutory claims. 
Moreover, the increased arbitration of 
statutory rights makes considerations of 
due process more important than in the 
past. For example, concerns have been 
raised about the adequacy of representa-
tion m arbitration cases that involve the 
application of statutory rights. 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment 
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In i 999, the National Academy of Arbitra-
tors—the premier organization of labor ar-
bitrators in North America—commissioned 
the authors to conduct a survey of its mem-
bership that it hoped would cast light on 
these concerns. We found that 82 percent of 
the 600 Academy members had arbitrated a 
dispute during the period from 1996-98 that 
required them to interpret or apply a stat-
ute, and that cases involving a claim of statu-
tory rights now constitute about 10 percent 
of their total caseload. We also found that a 
significant proportion of Academy members 
had applied statutory 
law in one or more of 
their arbitration cases 
bat lacked any dis-
cernible knowledge 
or experience m the 
applicable statute. Ap-
proximately 20 per-
cent of Academy 
members who have 
applied Title VII of 
the U.S. Civil Rights 
Act of 1964, for ex-
ample, have neither 
received training in 
nor had responsibility7 
for teaching the statute (Picher, Seeber, and 
Lipsky, pp 26-28). 
Dispute resolution in 
non-union settings 
At the same time, a growing number of non-
union employers, responding m part to the 
litigation explosion, have adopted dispute 
resolution procedures to help them manage 
their employment relations. In their review 
of research on ADR, Bingham and Chaohere 
conclude that "about half of 'large' private 
employers have established some sort of for-
mal dispute resolution procedure for their 
nonunion employees' ' (Bingham and 
Chaohere 1999, p. 99} In 1997 we conducted 
a survey of the Fortune 1000—the 1000 larg-
est corporations based m the U.S.—to gather 
data on their use of ADR (Our target respon-
dent was the general counsel or chief litiga-
tor in each of the corporations we surveyed, 
and we succeeded in obtaining a response 
rate of well over 60 percent Give n that sur-
ve}rs of high-level corporate populations usu-
ally generate response rates of less than 20 
percent, this is a very high rate foi this popu-
lation.) (Lipsky and Seeber, 1998A and 1998B) 
We asked respondents about their experi-
ences not just with the commonly applied 
forms of ADR—mediation and arbitra-
tion—but also with 
other processes and 
techniques that we 
suspected were less 
widely used. Chart 1 
reports respondents' 
experiences with the 
eight forms of ADR 
we asked about As 
the table indicates, 
near ly all our re-
spondents reported 
some exper ience 
with ADR They 
overwhelmingly re-
ported having used 
mediation (88 percent) and arbitration (80 
percent) at least once during the three-year 
period preceding tbe survey. 
Respondents also had a significant range 
of experience with other forms of ADR. 
More than 20 percent said they had used 
mediation-arbitration ("med-arb"), mini-tri-
als, fact-finding, or employee in-house 
grievance procedures m the past three 
years. (In contrast to grievance procedures 
in collective bargaining relationships, non-
union grievance procedures in these cor-
porations usually do not culminate in arbi-
tration. Rather, management reserves the 
right to make the final decision.) Further, 
more than 10 percent of respondents, rep-
resenting about 60 corporations, even had 
experience with the least-used forms of 
ADR—ombudspersons and peer reviews. 
Numerous groups 
have a vital stake in 
the design and imple-
mentation of fair and 
effective dispute 
resolution systems. 
Copyright © 2001. All rights reserved. 
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Thus, the breadth of penetration of ADR into 
American business is substantial, even sur-
prisingly so. When asked their favorite form 
of ADR process, counsel overwhelmingly 
reported mediation (63 percent); arbitration 
was a distant second (18 percent} Other 
forms of ADR clearly have not replaced tried-
and-true tactics completely and in fact pale 
in importance to mediation and arbitration. 
We were interested not just in the breadth 
of ADR use but also with the depth of its 
Chart i 
Experience with Forms of ADR among Fortune 1000 Companies 
Table i 
Frequency of ADR use (in percent)* 
penetration into corporate dispute resolu-
tion. Tor this reason, we asked respondents 
how frequently in the prior three years the57 
had used mediation and arbitration. Table 1 
provides data on this question. Of those re-
spondents who had used mediation, 19 per-
cent reported using it frequently or very fre-
quently, almost 30 percent said they used it 
rarely, and the largest group, 43 percent, 
reported using mediation occasionally 
The pattern is similar for arbitration: 
slightly more than 20 percent reported fre-
quent or very frequent use, 33 percent re-
ported having used the process rarely, and 
42 percent reported using arbitration occa-
sionally. Thus, it appears from our data that 
while most major U S. corporations have 
used one or more ADR techniques to re-
solve their disputes, only a smaller g roup-
perhaps a fifth of them—has used ADR in-
tensively. Other data in our survey support 
the proposition that about 15 to 20 percent 
of American firms have adopted ADR as a 
matter of corporate policy (Lipsky and 
Seeber, 1998A, pp. 21-23). 
Frequency (rights disputes) 
Company uses 
Very frequently 
Frequently 
Occasionally 
Rarely 
Not at all 
Company does not use 
Mediation 
87 
56 
13 1 
43 2 
29 9 
81 
13 
Arbitrat ion 
1% 
75 
13 1 
41 6 
33 2 
45 
9-. 
* In this and the foliowing two tables, the percentages on frequency of ADR use apply 
only to the companies that reported thai they had used mediation or arbitration ai least 
once in the preceding three years 
We also were curious about the use of cor-
porate ADR in "rights" and "interest" dis-
putes. Our data show significantly differ-
ent patterns in the forms of ADR used for 
rights disputes and interest disputes. As 
Table 2 shows, nearly all of the respon-
dents have used mediation in rights dis-
putes, but more than 60 percent have 
never used it for interest disputes. 
Table 2 
Frequency of mediation in rights and interest disputes (in percent)* 
Frequency 
Very freauently 
Frequently 
Occasionally 
Rarely 
Not at all 
Rights Disputes
 : Interest Disputes 
(administration I (negotiation of 
of contracts) contracts! 
5 6 
13 1 
43 2 
29 9 
1 7 
2 1 
76 
2S2 
8 1 ! 604 
Table 3 reports the data for the arbitration 
of rights and interest disputes. A pattern 
similar to mediation is found here: Over 
95 percent of the respondents reported 
some use of arbitration m rights disputes, 
but more than 84 percent reported that 
thej? had used arbitration in interest dis-
putes only rarely or not at all. 
To summarize, nearly all corporations have 
had experience with ADR. On closer in-
spection of the data, however, it becomes 
apparent that a much smaller number of 
companies use mediation and arbitration 
frequently, even in rights disputes. 
Table 3 
Frequency of arbitration in rights and interest disputes (in percent)* 
Frequency 
Very frequently 
Frequently 
Occasionally 
Rarely 
Not at all 
Rights Disputes j Interest Disputes 
7 5 3 0 
13 1 I 2 1 
416 10 7 
33 2 
4 5 
20 5 
63 7 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment 
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Hasidatory predispute 
arbitration 
The U.S. Supreme Court lias been in-
clined to favor the use of ADR in em-
ployment disputes. Most notably, in 
Gilmer v Interstate /Johnson Lane Corp / 
the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that a 
stockbroker who had agreed to the New 
York Stock Exchange's rule requiring ar-
bitration of employment disputes be-
tween brokers and member firms could 
not sue his employer for an alleged vio-
lation of the Age Discrimination in Em-
ployment Act but instead must arbitrate 
the dispute. Since Gilmer, most federal 
appellate courts in the U.S have applied 
the principle in that case to other indus-
tries and a variety of employment stat-
utes Encouraged by Gilmer and its prog-
eny, a growing number of non-union 
employers have required their employ-
ees—as a condition of their hiring or con-
tinued employment—to agree to use arbi-
tration to resolve statutory complaints 
rather than resorting to the courts. 
This form oi~ mandatory predispute arbitra-
tion has proven to be very controversial. 
Professor Katherine Stone has referred to 
these arbitration agreements as the '"yel-
low dog contracts" of the 1990s (Stone, pp 
J0I7-1050J. Although there maybe many 
advantages to the use of mandatory arbi-
tration in employment disputes, some ob-
servers contend that this process also pre-
sents serious problems in achieving fair-
ness and equity for the disputants. While 
employment contracts have been arbi-
trated without great controversy for years, 
man}7 observers are particularly concerned 
about the more recent use of mandatory 
employment arbitration to resolve statute-
based employment disputes in the non-
union sector. In the absence of unions or 
other forms of employee representation, 
it is the employer who designs, imple-
ments, and (ordinarily) pays for the dis-
pute resolution procedure 
Indeed, in Coles v Burns Int'l Security 
Servs ,4 the court ruled that due process 
requires that the employer pay the full 
expenses of the arbitration when the em-
ployment contract mandates the arbitra-
tion of a statutory dispute. Whether em-
ployers, acting entirely at their own dis-
cretion, give sufficient regard to due pro-
cess considerations in their design and use 
of ADR procedures remains an open ques-
tion and one which has been the subject 
of much litigation m recent years. 
Indeed, a federal commission appointed by 
the Clinton administration and headed by 
former Secretar37 of Labor John Dtmlop 
condemned the use of mandator}-
predispute arbitration in 1994 (U S. Depart-
ment of Labor, 1994, pp. 25-33j. Defenders 
of such agreements argue that, if properly 
designed, both employers and employees 
have the advantage of a fast, fair, and inex-
pensive means of resolving complaints 
(Sherwyn, Tracey. and Eigen, pp. 73-150j 
Stakeholder motives and 
objectives 
Numerous groups have a vital stake in the 
design and implementation of fair and ef-
fective dispute resolution systems. Stake-
holders include employers and employees, 
corporations, government agencies and 
unions, civil rights organizations, members 
of the bar, arbitrators and mediators and the 
organizations that represent them, and oth-
ers. Needless to say, society itself nas a criti-
cal interest in workplace dispute resolution 
systems because of the close and obvious 
link between these systems and society's 
interest in achieving equity and efficiency 
m the: operation of its workplace institutions. 
Currently, there is broad support, across 
most stakeholder groups, for the use of 
dispute resolution systems m employment 
relations. The motives underlying their 
support, however, differ across these vari-
Copyright © 2001. All rights reserved. 
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ous groups and are not necessarily com-
patible. The challenge in establishing fair 
and effective dispute resolution systems 
is to take account of the sometimes com-
patible but often conflicting objectives of 
the various stakeholders. In this section, 
we will deal with the motives and objec-
tives of four key stakeholder groups: em-
ployers, unions, public agencies, and or-
ganizations representing neutrals. 
Employers. Employers, various experts 
have noted, have a "host" of motives for 
instituting workplace dispute resolution 
systems (see, for example, Lipsky and 
Seeber, 1998A, pp. 15-19). Many employ-
ers have a sincere desire to provide their 
employees with a dispute resolution sys-
tem that is fair and just. The current em-
ployer interest in dispute resolution sys-
tems may be the consequence, m part, of 
the sustained economic expansion in the 
1990s, which tightened labor markets dra-
maticaTiy. (The U.S. unemployment rate 
fell to 3.9 percent in April 2000, the lowest 
rate in over 30 years.) The exceptionally 
tight U.S. labor market heightened employ-
ers-' need to offer attractive working condi-
tions to current and prospective employ-
ees. Employers who offer fair dispute reso-
lution systems may have a competitive la-
bor market advantage over employers who 
do not and may find it easier to recruit and 
retain the emploj'ees the}? desire. 
The majority of employers that have in-
stituted dispute resolution systems, how-
ever, have been motivated by the desire 
to reduce the costs and delays associated 
with conventional litigation. As Bingham 
and Chachere have noted in their review 
of ADR research, 
The most commonly stated rea-
sons given by organizations to ex-
plain the adoption of ADR are the 
increased volume of employment 
claims; lower cost in time, risk, 
and money relative to more for-
mal dispute resolution pro-
cesses .; the speed with which 
ADR can resolve them; changes 
in the regulatory environment 
which encouraged (directly and 
indirectly} workplace ADR; a fo-
cus on disputants' underlying in-
terests rather than on the validity 
of their positions; an effort to 
maintain and/or enhance produc-
tivity (through enhanced long-
term working relationships via 
reduced absenteeism and turn-
over and increased morale and 
organizational loyalty); greater 
degree of confidentiality available 
from ADR, the expertise of the 
neutrals superior to that of a jury; 
and union avoidance. (Bingham 
and Chachere, 1999, pp. 98-99) 
Between 70 and 80 percent of the major 
corporations m the U.S. reported using vari-
ous ADR procedures because they believe 
such procedures saved them time and 
money. Employers have also noted their 
strong desire to retain control over the 
management of conflict, which they believe 
is enhanced by the use of both ADR proce-
dures and conflict management systems 
(Lipsky and Seeber, 1998A, pp. 16-17). 
Frustration with the growing burden of liti-
gation led many in the business commu-
nity to oppose various federal measures to 
regulate the employment relationship and 
to lobby for tort (or legal) reforms that 
would limit the ability of one party to sue 
another. One reform most sought by Ameri-
can business would cap the amount of dam-
ages a plaintiff could seek in a civil action. 
In the 1994 congressional campaign, tort 
reform was a major provision m the Repub-
lican Party's "Contract with America," the 
party's list of statutory measures it pledged 
to pass if it gained control of Congress. 
But when the Republicans did win a major-
ity in Congress, their effort to enact tort 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment 
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reform failed in the face of President 
Clinton's opposition. The failure of federal 
tort reform is still another factor motivat-
ing American employers to adopt ADR; 
many employers felt that if they could not 
persuade politicians to constrain the growth 
of lawsuits or limit their effects, they could 
at least devise their own cheaper and faster 
means of managing disputes. 
Although the effort to achieve federal tort 
reform failed, legislators and policy mak-
ers were not oblivious to the stresses be-
ing felt in the American legal system. In 
1990, for example, Congress passed the 
Civd Justice Reform Act, which encour-
aged federal courts to experiment with 
ADR. In 1998, Congress took the next step, 
requiring federal courts to use ADR. The 
court systems m more than half the states 
now encourage, or even mandate, the use 
of ADR to reduce backlogs and speed up 
the handling of disputes. Administrative 
agencies, such as the federal Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission, have 
begun to require the use of ADR to resolve 
complaints (U.S. Equal Employment Op-
portunity^ Commission, 1995; see, also, 
Miller. 1995, pp 17 and 87). 
Unions. Unions have viewed dispute reso-
lution systems with some skepticism On 
the one hand,, mam r unions fear that em-
ployers often institute workplace dispute 
resolution systems as a means of avoiding 
unionization. Because most employers will 
not freely admit to anti-union motives, 
hard evidence on this concern is lacking 
There is, however, sufficient anecdotal 
evidence to suggest that labor's fears, m 
some cases, are justified. 
On the other hand, many unions support 
the design and implementation of fair and 
equitable dispute resolution systems. They 
believe such systems are capable of pro-
tecting the best interests of both their or-
ganizations and the employees they rep-
resent and can be entirely compatible with 
a collective bargaining agreement. Many 
unions recognize that certain types of 
employee complaints cannot readily be 
handled through traditional collective bar-
gaining channels. 
For example, employee concerns rang-
ing from the quality of their relations 
with supervisors and fellow employees 
to the adequacy of their computers and 
office equipment are not usually matters 
that are easily handled through the griev-
ance procedure Some unions have dis-
covered that employee complaints that 
fall outside the purview of the manda-
t o r topics of bargaining may be ad-
dressed effectively through a dispute 
resolution system designed jointly by the 
parties Indeed, some unions have em-
braced ADR with enthusiasm, not only 
valuing its potential benefits for their 
members but also recognizing that ADR 
systems can extend the authority and 
influence of a union into areas normally 
considered management prerogatives. 
More significant, perhaps, is the manner 
in which unions and employers handle 
empkryee allegations of statutory viola-
tions. In some union-management rela-
tionships, many, if not all, statutory 
claims are channeled through the griev-
ance and arbitration procedures con-
tained in the collective bargaining agree-
ment But an increasing number of unions 
and employers have estabhshec, for cer-
tain types of statutory claims, dispute 
resolution procedures that stand outside 
the collective bargaining contract. For 
example, some unions and employers 
have established special procedures to 
handle sexual harassment complaints. 
Also, Employee Assistance Programs, es-
tablished to deal with employees suffer-
ing from alcoholism, drug abuse, and re-
lated problems, sometimes contain their 
own dispute resolution procedures, an-
other form of ADR that can coexist with 
conventional grievance procedures. 
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Public agencies. As Bingham and 
Chachere have noted, 
Adoption of ADR in the public 
sector is somewhat different 
from the private sector. In the 
federal sector, Congress enacted 
the Administrative Dispute Reso-
lution Act (ADRA) in 1990 to 
spur agencies to consider using 
ADR. In a 1994 study [by the 
GAOl, 31% of federal agencies 
had some form of ADR in place 
for emploj^ee complaints. By 
1996 the federal agency rate had 
increased to 49% (Bingham and 
Chachere, p. 101). 
In the mid-1990s, a task force appointed 
by the U.S. Secretary of Labor examined 
employment relations in state and local 
government and concluded that m some 
respects the public sector led the private 
sector m the adoption of ADR systems. 
despite the requirements of the ADRA, 
have lagged behind major private sector 
employers in part because federal work-
ers have had for many years "multiple av-
enues for redress" of their complaints and 
grievances (Kriesky, 1999, p. 250). The 
Merit Systems Protection Board, estab-
lished by the Civil Service Reform Act of 
1978, adjudicates many types of grievances 
in the federal sector. Some federal sector 
managers have been reluctant to establish 
ADR systems that would constitute yet 
another "avenue for redress" for the em-
ployees of their agencies. 
Surve3's suggest the adoption of ADR pro-
cedures and systems by public sector agen-
cies and their unions in the U.S. appar-
ently quickened in the 1990s. ADR's 
growth was spurred on by various statutes 
and regulations and frequently supported 
by elected officials, who generally were 
motivated by the same set of factors oper-
ating m the private sector. 
Overall, it appear[s] that the pub-
lic workplace might be more re-
ceptive to [ADR] systems, par-
ticularly to setting them up in a 
manner that protect[s] the fact 
and appearance of neutrality and 
independence, and provid[es] 
employeesPj access to the court 
if the}-' felt their case was meri-
torious or [theyj did not choose 
to use the ADR system (U.S. De-
partment of Labor, 1996, p. 81). 
A recent survey has shown "that the vast 
majority of cabinet and non-cabinet-level 
agencies were experimenting with the use 
of mediation in personnel and employ-
ment disputes.'1 Very few federal agencies, 
however, made use of arbitration (Bingham 
and Chachere, p. 102) Apparently the rate 
of adoption of ADR procedures in some 
public jurisdictions has been slower than 
the rate of adoption m major U.S. corpora-
tions. For example, some federal agencies, 
Neutrals and their organizations Obvi-
ously, the professional organizations that 
represent arbitrators, mediators, and other 
workplace neutrals in the United States 
have a vital stake in the evolution of em-
ployment dispute resolution systems. 
These organizations include the National 
Academy of Arbitrators, the Society of Pro-
fessionals in Dispute Resolution, the 
American Arbitration Association, the Dis-
pute Resolution Section of the American 
Bar Association, among others. The con-
troversies surrounding the rise of employ-
ment arbitration, for example, have gen-
erated intense debates within the National 
Academy of Arbitrators 
The Academy has responded m a prelimi-
nary fashion to the changing realities of 
employment relations through its endorse-
ment of the "Due Process Protocol for 
Mediation and Arbitration of Statutory 
Disputes Arising out of the Employment 
Relationship." The Due Process Protocol 
Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment 
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was developed bj7 a task force consisting 
of representatives from: 
s the Academy, 
a the Labor and Employment Law Sec-
tion of the American Bar Association, 
a the American Arbitration Association, 
a the Society of Professionals in Dispute 
Resolution, 
a the U S. Federal Mediation and Concili-
ation Service;, 
B the National Employment Lawyers 
Association, and 
a the American Civil Liberties Union 
The task force debated the question of 
mandatory predispute arbitration agree-
ments as a condition of employment but 
d^d not "achieve consensus on this diffi-
cult issue," other than to agree that such 
agreements should be knowingly made. 
The task force did, however, agree on a 
set of "standards ot exemplary due pro-
cess.'' including 
a the right of employees in arbitration 
and mediat ion cases to be repre-
sented by a spokesperson of their 
own choosing, 
a employer reimbursement of at least a 
portion of employees' attorney fees, 
especially for lower paid employees, 
and 
a "adequate" employee access to "all infor-
mation reasonably relevant to mediation 
and''or arbitration of their claims." 
The Due Process Protocol also calls for the 
use of qualified and impartial arbitrators 
and mediators drawn from rosters that are 
diversif ied on the basis of gender, 
ethnicity, background, and experience To 
guarantee an adequate supply of qualified 
neutrals the Protocol also calls for "the 
development of a training program to edu-
cate existing and potential labor and em-
ployment mediators and arbitrators" (see 
the discussion m Dunlop and Zack). 
The Academy was concerned that unfair 
procedures in employment arbitration 
and the involuntary predispute exclusion 
of employees from access to the courts 
and regulatory agencies was tainting the 
image of all workplace arbitration. There-
fore, at its Fiftieth Annual Meeting (May 
1997), the Academy went on record as 
being opposed to the mandatory arbitra-
tion of statutory rights of emploj'ees as a 
condition of employment where such 
schemes preclude recourse to the courts 
and statutory tribunals. 
Recognizing that such arbitrations are nev-
ertheless lawful as confirmed by Gilmer, 
ax the same meeting the Academy promul-
gated guidelines to assist its members in 
conducting employment arbitrations that 
involve the adjudication of statutory rights. 
The guidelines strive to en sun; fairness 
and due process, giving the fullest scope 
to the procedural protections, evidentiary 
burdens, and remedies available under the 
statutes themselves To further its inter-
est in protecting the integrity of the arbi-
tration process the Academy also has in-
tervened as amicus curiae in a number of 
cases before the courts involving the; ap-
plication and refinement of Gilmer (Ticher, 
Seeber, and Lipsky, pp 7-8). 
Conclusion 
The development of alternative1, dispute reso-
lution has resulted 111 s paradox .n Ameri-
can employment relations. On the one hand, 
among unionized employers and employ-
ees a functioning ADR system has existed 
for several decades, but a growing number 
of federal laws and regulations have put a 
severe strain on this system Increasingly, 
grievance arbitrators are requirec, to apply 
relevant federal statutes in the cases that 
they hear. Some experts fear that many of 
these arbitrators lack the training and expe-
rience necessary to discharge this responsi-
bility. and that if the}' cannot perform this 
function effectively the industrial relations 
version of ADR will be in jeopardy. 
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On the other hand, an increasing number 
of non-union employers are adopting ADR 
procedures to resolve employee com-
plaints, including those involving statutory 
claims, precisely because they believe 
mediation and arbitration are more effec-
tive than litigation in resolving such dis-
putes. It is ironic that the rush to adopt 
ADR to resolve employment disputes in 
the non-union sector is occurring at the 
same time that doubts about the effective-
ness of the longstanding ADR system in 
the union sector have never been greater. 
We remain optimistic about the prospects 
for reconciling these contradictions, how-
ever. First, there is widespread recognition 
on the part of employers, unions, public 
agencies, neutrals, and other stakeholders 
that legitimate concerns exist, and there is 
a growing resolve to address them. Second, 
there is an emerging consensus about the 
nature of the solutions. For example, virtu-
ally all parties agree that steps need to be 
taken to assure a "level playing field'' inborn 
the union and non-union sectors Employ-
ees, whether union or non-union, need to 
have access to fair procedures that guaran-
tee at least elementary due process. Also, 
there is nearly unanimous agreement that, 
if arbitrators and mediators are going to be 
responsible for the enforcement of statu-
tory rights, they need to have appropriate 
credentials, including adequate education 
and training in substantive law. The 
privatization of the American system of 
justice through the use of ADR will succeed 
only if these conditions are fulfilled. 
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